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REMEDIES AND THE GOVERNMENT’S
CONSTITUTIONALLY HARMFUL SPEECH
Helen Norton*
I. INTRODUCTION
When we see the terms “government” and “speech” in close
proximity, we often think of the constitutional problems triggered by the
government’s efforts to regulate others’ expression. In this brief essay, I
focus instead on the constitutional issues raised by the government’s own
speech. Although the Free Speech Clause prohibits the government from
discriminating on the basis of viewpoint when regulating private parties’
speech, the Supreme Court’s government speech doctrine permits the
government to express its own viewpoint when it itself is speaking. 1 In so
holding, the Court recognizes that the government’s expressive choices
are often quite valuable to the public and thus appropriately privileges the
government’s ability to make its own decisions about what it will and
won’t say. 2
As I have suggested elsewhere, however, the Court’s doctrine
remains incomplete in at least two respects:
First, the Court to date has failed to insist that the government
affirmatively identify itself as the source of expression as a condition of
claiming the government speech defense, even though meaningful
political accountability requires such transparency. Second, the Court
has yet to grapple with the ways in which the government’s speech
sometimes affirmatively threatens specific constitutional values (apart

* Professor and Ira C. Rothgerber, Jr. Chair in Constitutional Law, University of Colorado School of
Law. Thanks to Jessica Reed-Baum for excellent research assistance, and to Fred Bloom, Alan Chen,
Melissa Hart, Sharon Jacobs, Margot Kaminski, Craig Konnoth, Scott Moss, Scott SkinnerThompson, and Tracy Thomas for thoughtful comments.
1. See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1757-58 (2017).
2. See id. at 1758 (characterizing government speech as “important—indeed, essential”).
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from whether and when the government’s religious speech sometimes
violates the Establishment Clause). 3

Indeed, the government’s expressive choices should sometimes trigger
our constitutional concern. Examples include the government’s threats or
lies to silence the press or other governmental critics, 4 the government’s
speech that facilitates discrimination against protected class members, 5
and the government’s lies that deprive its targets of important liberties.6
At the same time, constitutional challenges to the government’s
speech raise vexing problems of their own. For example, although the
potential harms of the government’s speech can at times be specific and
individualized, at other times they seem more collective and diffuse.7
Constitutional challenges to the government’s speech, moreover, require
the judiciary to evaluate the politically accountable branches in ways that
trigger separation of powers and related concerns. 8 These complexities, in
turn, invite courts to narrow the circumstances under which they will
second-guess other governmental actors’ expressive choices. 9
Along these lines, Thomas Emerson and Mark Yudof were among
the first to recognize the constitutional harms sometimes inflicted by the
government’s speech, as well as the barriers to the judiciary’s ability to
redress these injuries. 10 Yudof, for example, expressed concern about
3. Helen Norton, Government Speech and the Manufacture of Doubt, 16 FIRST AM. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2018), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3097156
[hereinafter Norton, Manufacture of Doubt].
4. See Helen Norton, The Government’s Lies and the Press Clause, 89 U. COLO. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2018), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2998909
[hereinafter Norton, Press Clause].
5. See Helen Norton, The Equal Protection Implications of Government’s Hateful Speech, 54
WM. & MARY L. REV. 159, 194-98 (2012) [hereinafter Norton, Government’s Hateful Speech].
6. See Helen Norton, The Government’s Lies and the Constitution, 91 IND. L.J. 73, 89-107
(2015) [hereinafter Norton, The Government’s Lies].
7. See id. at 83 (“[G]overnment lies can inflict the harms of disloyalty in ways that severely
injure not only targeted individuals but also the broader public.”).
8. Indeed, questions about remedies (as well as justiciability) are particularly acute with
respect to the government’s most devastating lies—e.g., its lies about its justifications for military
force. As I’ve written elsewhere: “[O]ne can easily anticipate that constitutional litigation challenging
such assertions as lies might be motivated by partisan rather than public interests, and that the
judiciary might thus be reluctant to second-guess the choices of the President when exercising her
Article II powers as commander-in-chief. . . . These [and other] complexities suggest that the
government’s most catastrophic lies may be those especially resistant to redress.” Id. at 118-19.
9. See id. at 83-89. To be sure, concerns about justiciability and remedies are often closely
intertwined. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions about Due Process, Judicial Review, and
Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 313 (1993) (observing the “variety of perplexities”
that involve the relationship between rights to judicial review and rights to constitutional remedies).
10. See Thomas Emerson, Freedom of Expression in Wartime, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 975, 1007
(1968) (“There is no effective legal remedy for much of [the government’s harassment of political
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what he saw as the daunting challenges raised by constitutional litigation
to constrain the government’s expression: “The difficulties in fashioning
remedies are so substantial that they corroborate the wisdom of courts in
general in avoiding the attempt to delimit the boundaries of
unconstitutional government expression.” 11 More specifically, Yudof
feared injunctions because of separation of powers concerns and the
potential for chilling valuable government speech 12—even while
acknowledging that “[i]njunctions may be appropriate in a few outrageous
cases where a course of misconduct is likely to be repeated.”13 He noted
the possibility of declaratory relief but wondered about its utility. 14 And
he saw at best a very limited role for damages. 15
But while I agree with Yudof’s menu of remedial possibilities, in this
brief essay I seek to cast a more positive light on them: in certain
circumstances, injunctive relief, declaratory relief, or damages can and
should be available to redress the government’s constitutionally harmful
speech. I seek to show that although the search for constitutional remedies
for the government’s harmful expression is challenging, it is far from
futile. This search is also increasingly important at a time when the
government’s expressive powers continue to grow—along with the
government’s willingness to use these powers for disturbing purposes and
with troubling consequences. 16 In short, courts and lawyers need to

dissenters through its own speech]. Statements of public officials or warnings of investigation, for
instance, are not subject to judicial redress. Nor is it possible to obtain court review of most activities
of legislative committees, apart from citations for contempt . . . .”). Indeed, these sorts of concerns
have led me elsewhere to examine possible statutory, structural, political, and expressive responses
to the government’s harmful speech. See Norton, Press Clause, supra note 4 (discussing engaged
counterspeech and oversight by other government actors, the press, and the general public as
nonconstitutional remedies for the government’s constitutionally harmful speech).
10. See Norton, Manufacture of Doubt, supra note 3.
11. MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLITICS, LAW, AND GOVERNMENT
EXPRESSION IN AMERICA 205 (1983).
12. Id. at 206 (“The most dangerous of the remedies is by far the injunction. It operates on
government much the way that prior restraints operate on private expression.”).
13. Id.
14. Id. (“Declaratory relief might be available. Whether it would do more than produce illfeeling among the branches of government is questionable, though it might serve a symbolic
function.”).
15. Id. at 206-07 (“Damages, except in cases of individualized and unique injuries, also strike
me as unworkable, even assuming that some constitutional or statutory basis can be found for such
suits against government agencies or officials, and that here is no sovereign immunity bar to such
remedies. . . . The damage remedy makes sense only when individuals have been discretely harmed,
as for example, when government defames particular individuals or invades their privacy. Recoveries
would be based on common-law tort doctrines and federal and state tort-claims acts (most of which
would need to be amended to encompass such injuries.”).
16. See Norton, Manufacture of Doubt, supra note 3.
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identify remedies that permit us to name, and stop, the constitutional
harms sometimes inflicted by the government’s destructive expressive
choices.
To be sure, questions about remedies are far from the only difficult
problems raised by constitutional challenges to the government’s harmful
speech. For example, as a threshold matter, sometimes we are not so sure
that the speech at issue is actually the government’s, as can be true of
expressive interactions between government and private speakers in
contexts that create doubt about the source of the contested speech.17 Even
if we focus on the many situations where the governmental source of the
contested speech is clear, we might still wonder whether the dispute is
justiciable, especially when we understand the government’s speech as a
form of soft power distinct from its more traditional hard law actions. 18
Finally, even if the dispute is justiciable, we may then struggle with the
merits of the constitutional claim; for example, when does the
government’s speech cross the line from permissible persuasion, praise,
or criticism to constitutionally impermissible coercion? 19
I acknowledge that these are interesting, hard, and important
questions (and I have discussed them elsewhere). But in this essay, I seek
only to show that there is some number of situations where the contested
speech is clearly the government’s, where the dispute over its
constitutionality is justiciable, and where the government’s speech does
in fact violate a constitutional provision—and where courts can then
appropriately identify and award constitutional remedies to stop, or call
out, the government’s constitutionally harmful expression. In other words,
I seek simply to reframe the conversation: the question should not be
whether the government’s unconstitutional speech is ever remediable, but
rather when and how.
II. MAKE IT STOP: INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
First, injunctive relief can be available to put a stop to the
government’s constitutionally harmful speech. In fact, courts have long
considered injunctive relief in cases challenging what we only now
17. See Helen Norton, Government Speech and Political Courage, 68 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE
61 (2015) (proposing a test for determining whether contested speech is actually the government’s).
18. Sometimes disputes are found nonjusticiable because political processes remain available
to redress concerns about the government’s choices. But such political processes may not be available,
as a functional matter, when the government lies or otherwise speaks in ways that undermine
meaningful political accountability. See generally Norton, The Government’s Lies, supra note 6.
19. See id. at 89-197; Norton, Government’s Hateful Speech, supra note 5, at 194-98; Norton,
Press Clause, supra note 4.
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describe as “government speech.” Possibilities include court orders that
require the government to stop, take down, or excise its threatening,
inaccurate, hateful, or otherwise harmful speech alleged to violate specific
constitutional protections.
These decisions make clear, for example, that injunctive relief is
available to stop the government’s speech that punishes or silences its
targets’ expression in violation of the Free Speech Clause. Recall Bantam
Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, where the petitioners—who were distributors of
sexually explicit but non-obscene books and magazines—successfully
sought declaratory and injunctive relief against threatening speech by the
Rhode Island Commission to Encourage Morality in Youth. 20 There the
Commission sent letters to the petitioners stating that it found some of
their materials “objectionable for sale” to those under 18 and that it was
sharing its views with local police departments. 21 The letters often also
mentioned the Commission’s “duty to recommend to the Attorney
General prosecution of purveyors of obscenity.” 22 The Supreme Court
found that the Commission’s letters were sufficiently coercive to amount
to unconstitutional censorship:
The appellees are not law enforcement officers; they do not pretend that
they are qualified to give or that they attempt to give distributors only
fair legal advice. Their conduct as disclosed by this record shows plainly
that they went far beyond advising the distributors of their legal rights
and liabilities. Their operation was in fact a scheme of state censorship
effectuated by extralegal sanctions; they acted as an agency not to advise
but to suppress. 23

Injunctive relief can similarly be available against federal
government expression for claims brought directly under the First (or,
with respect to equal protection or due process violations, Fifth)
Amendments. 24 Consider, for example, Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Committee v. McGrath, where several organizations sought declaratory
and injunctive relief under the First Amendment from then-Attorney
General Tom Clark’s statement characterizing them as Communist front

20. 372 U.S. 58 (1963).
21. Id. at 59-63.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 72; see also id. at 67 and n.8 (citing a number of cases in which “threats of prosecution
or of license revocation, or listings or notifications of supposedly obscene or objectionable
publications or motion pictures, on the part of chiefs of police or prosecutors, have been
enjoined . . . .”).
24. Some plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief from the federal government directly
under the First or Fifth Amendments. With respect to federal agencies, see also 5 U.S.C. 702.

54

CONLAWNOW

[9:49

organizations. 25 The Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s dismissal
of the claim, stating that the effect of “the inclusion in the Attorney
General’s list of a designation [as Communist] that is patently arbitrary or
contrary to fact . . . is to cripple the functioning and damage the reputation
of those organizations in their respective communities and in the
nation.” 26 As the Court made clear:
These complaints do not raise the question of the personal liability of
public officials for money damages caused by their ultra vires acts. They
ask only for declaratory and injunctive relief striking the names of the
designated organizations from the Attorney General’s published list and,
as far as practicable, correcting the public records. The respondents are
not immune from such a proceeding. . . . 27

Lower courts have similarly enjoined the government’s expressive
choices that are sufficiently coercive of its targets’ speech to violate the
First Amendment, or, with respect to state and local governments, the
25. 341 U.S. 123 (1951); see also Hentoff v. Ichord, 318 F. Supp. 1175, 1182 (D.D.C. 1970)
(“The conclusion is inescapable that the Report neither serves nor was intended to serve any purpose
but the one explicitly indicated in the Report: to inhibit further speech on college campuses by those
listed individuals and others whose political persuasion is not in accord with that of members of the
Committee. If a report has no relationship to any existing or future proper legislative purpose and is
issued solely for sake of exposure or intimidation, then it exceeds the legislative function of Congress;
and where the publication will inhibit free speech and assembly, publication and distribution in
official form at government expense may be enjoined.”); Note, Blacklisting Through the Official
Publication of Congressional Reports, 81 YALE L.J. 188 (1971) (explaining the subsequent history
and implications of the Hentoff decision).
26. McGrath, 341 U.S. at 138-39 (citations and footnotes omitted); see also GEOFFREY STONE,
PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME 327 (2004) (“In December 1947, the Truman
Administration published its first attorney general’s list of subversive organizations, which quickly
became the official national ‘blacklist.’ Inclusion of an organization on the attorney general’s list was
tantamount to public branding, without a hearing. Contributions to listed organizations quickly dried
up, membership dwindled, and available meeting spaces became scarce.”).
27. McGrath, 341 U.S. at 140-41 (“Finally, the standing of the petitioners to bring these suits
is clear. The touchstone to justiciability is injury to a legally protected right and the right of a bona
fide charitable organization to carry on its work, free from defamatory statements of the kind
discussed, is such a right. It is unrealistic to contend that because the respondents gave no orders
directly to the petitioners to change their course of conduct, relief cannot be granted against what the
respondents actually did. We long have granted relief to parties whose legal rights have been violated
by unlawful public action, although such action made no direct demands upon them. The complaints
here amply allege past and impending serious damages caused by the actions of which the petitioners
complain.”); see also id. at 142 (Black, J., concurring) (“Without notice or hearing and under color of
the President’s Executive Order No. 9835, the Attorney General found petitioners guilty of harboring
treasonable opinions and designs, officially branded them as Communists, and promulgated his
findings and conclusions for particular use as evidence against government employees suspected of
disloyalty. In the present climate of public opinion it appears certain that the Attorney General’s much
publicized findings, regardless of their truth or falsity, are the practical equivalents of confiscation
and death sentences for any blacklisted organization not possessing extraordinary financial, political
or religious prestige and influence.”).
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Fourteenth Amendment. For example, a federal district court awarded
injunctive relief against the federal Attorney General’s Commission on
Pornography, which had sent letters to a number of magazine distributors
threatening to list them in its final report as purveyors of pornography. 28
Drawing in great part from the Supreme Court’s decision in Bantam
Books, the lower court found that the Commission’s letters were
sufficiently coercive to raise serious First Amendment issues, and thus
issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting the Commission from listing
the distributors in its final report, and requiring the Commission “to send
a letter to each addressee of the original letter advising them that the
original letter has been withdrawn and that no reply is required.” 29 In
short, sometimes courts enjoin—and thus put a stop to—the government’s
threatening speech that endangers key liberties.
Relatedly, and more recently, the Seventh Circuit enjoined a sheriff’s
threatening speech that sought to shut down certain sexually explicit
advertisements:
As a citizen or father, or in any other private capacity, Sheriff Dart can
denounce Backpage to his heart’s content. He is in good company; many
people are disturbed or revolted by the kind of sex ads found on
Backpage’s website. And even in his official capacity the sheriff can
express his distaste for Backpage and its look-alikes; that is, he can
exercise what is called ‘[freedom of] government speech.’ A
government entity, including therefore the Cook County Sheriff’s
Office, is entitled to say what it wants to say—but only within limits. It
is not permitted to employ threats to squelch the free speech of private
citizens. ‘[A] government’s ability to express itself is [not] without
restriction. . . . [T]he Free Speech Clause itself may constrain the
government’s speech.’ 30

The government’s speech sometimes violates constitutional
provisions other than the Free Speech Clause. For example, in Anderson
v. Martin, the Supreme Court enjoined (what we now understand as)
governmental speech that invited and facilitated private discrimination in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause. There the plaintiffs filed a
section 1983 action to enjoin Louisiana’s state law that required the

28. Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Meese, 639 F. Supp. 581, 588 (D.D.C. 1986) (quoting the
Commission’s letters as stating that the Commission had “received testimony alleging that your
company is involved in the sale or distribution of pornography. The Commission has determined that
it would be appropriate to allow your company an opportunity to respond to the allegations prior to
drafting its final report section on identified distributors.”).
29. Id. at 587-88.
30. Backpage.com v. Dart, 807 F.3d 229, 234-35 (7th Cir. 2015) (citations omitted).
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government to state each candidate’s race on all ballots, 31 and the
Supreme Court agreed that the government’s statement impermissibly
“encourage[d] its voters to discriminate on the grounds of race” in
violation of equal protection. 32 Other instances of government speech that
invite or facilitate private discrimination against protected class
members—as well as that which deters protected class members from
exercising certain rights or seeking certain opportunities—may similarly
violate the Equal Protection Clause. 33 Examples could include challenges
to state or local jurisdictions that require that public schools’ sex
education curriculum include “[a]n emphasis, in a factual manner and
from a public health perspective, that homosexuality is not a lifestyle
acceptable to the general public.” 34
In thinking through these issues, we can also draw from the
Establishment Clause context, in which courts often assess whether the
government’s expressive choices—e.g., to engage in prayer or to display
certain religious symbols—unconstitutionally “establish” religion even if
they inflict only relatively diffuse or intangible injuries. 35 Elsewhere I’ve
31. See STEPHEN B. BURBANK & SEAN FARHANG, RIGHTS AND RETRENCHMENT: THE
COUNTERREVOLUTION AGAINST FEDERAL LITIGATION 30 (2017) (describing section 1983 as “the
broadest federal civil rights statute and among the most consequential. It provides a private cause of
action against any person who, ‘under color’ of state law, causes the deprivation of rights secured by
the ‘Constitution and laws’ of the United States. . . . The statute can only be enforced by private
lawsuits; it contains no government right to sue of other public enforcement provisions.”). Attorney’s
fees also may be available for prevailing plaintiffs. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b).
32. 375 U.S. 399, 402 (1964); see also id. (“But by placing a racial label on a candidate at the
most crucial stage in the electoral process—the instant before the vote is cast—the State furnishes a
vehicle by which racial prejudice may be so aroused as to operate against one group because of race
and for another. This is true because by directing the citizen’s attention to the single consideration of
race or color, the State indicates that a candidate’s race or color is an important—perhaps
paramount—consideration in the citizen’s choice, which may decisively influence the citizen to cast
his ballot along racial lines. Hence in a State or voting district where Negroes predominate, that race
is likely to be favored by a racial designation on the ballot, while in those communities where other
races are in the majority, they may be preferred. The vice lies not in the resulting injury but in the
placing of the power of the State behind a racial classification that induces racial prejudice at the
polls.”).
33. See Norton, Government’s Hateful Speech, supra note 5, at 194-208.
34. See ALA. CODE § 16-40A-2(c)(8) (1975); see also Clifford Rosky, Anti-Gay Curriculum
Laws, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1463 (2017) (describing a variety of state laws regulating public school
teaching and curricula).
35. See Mary Jean Dolan, Government Identity Speech and Religion: Establishment Clause
Limits After Summum, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 24 (2010) (“[A] large proportion of all
establishment clause jurisprudence could be thought of as involving claims about government
religious speech, with the other broad category related to government aid.”). Lower courts have
recognized at least two circumstances under which the government’s religious speech may inflict
sufficiently concrete and particularized injuries upon listeners to satisfy the requirements of standing
and empower the federal courts to consider the Establishment Clause claim. See David Spencer,
What’s the Harm? NonTaxpayer Standing to Challenge Religious Symbols, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB.

2018]

CONSTITUTIONALLY HARMFUL SPEECH

57

made merits arguments that draw from that tradition: just as courts
sometimes find that the government’s religious speech is sufficiently
coercive of listeners’ religious belief or practice to violate the
Establishment Clause, so too might government’s hateful speech directed
at protected class members sometimes be sufficiently coercive to violate
the Equal Protection Clause. 36 Here, I focus on remedies. And here too we
can find plenty of examples of plaintiffs’ successful claims under 42
U.S.C. section 1983 for injunctive and declaratory relief from state and
local governments’ religious speech that violates the Establishment
Clause. Some of these decisions involve challenges to the government’s
religious speech that takes the form of prayer; 37 others involve challenges
to the government’s display of the Ten Commandments in certain public
places or of religious symbols in holiday settings; 38 others involve
challenges to city or county seals or license plates that feature crosses or
other religious symbols. 39
POL’Y 1071, 1075 (2011) (“The dominant approach requires a plaintiff to show some version of direct
and unwelcome contact with the challenged symbol or display. A second approach requires a plaintiff
to show that he altered his behavior to avoid contact with the allegedly offensive display.”). In the
equal protection contest, for example, most potential plaintiffs could show direct and unwelcome
contact with the government’s hateful or threatening message, and some could also show that the
government’s message altered their behavior. Note that this sort of injury-in-fact standing as it arises
in the Establishment Clause context is very different from taxpayer standing, in which a taxpayer
challenges specific congressional appropriations alleged to establish religion in violation of the
Constitution. See, e.g., Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc., 551 U.S. 58, 592-93, 61011 (2007) (holding that taxpayer standing is limited to challenges to Congress’s assertion of its power
under the taxing and spending clauses and thus not available to challenge executive branch
expenditures).
36. Norton, Government’s Hateful Speech, supra note 5, at 194-98.
37. E.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. V. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (ruling in favor of plaintiff
who brought Establishment Clause challenge to public high school’s prayer at football games and
who sought injunctive and declaratory relief under section 1983); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592
(1992) (ruling in favor of plaintiff who brought Establishment Clause challenge to public high
school’s prayer at graduation ceremony and who sought a permanent injunction under section 1983);
Joyner v. Forsyth County, 653 F.3d 341 (4th Cir 2011) (ruling in favor of plaintiff who brought
Establishment Clause challenge to county board’s sponsorship of certain sectarian prayers and who
sought declaratory and injunctive relief under section 1983).
38. E.g., McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (ruling in favor of plaintiff who
brought Establishment Clause challenge against county’s posting of Ten Commandments at its
courthouses and who sought injunctive relief under section 1983); Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492
US 573 (1989) (ruling in favor of plaintiff who brought Establishment Clause challenge to county’s
inclusion of a crèche in a holiday display and who sought injunctive relief under section 1983).
39. E.g., Robinson v. City of Edmond, 68 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 1995) (ruling in favor of plaintiff
who brought Establishment Clause challenge to city seal that depicted a cross and who sought
declaratory and injunctive relief as well as nominal damages and attorney’s fees under section 1983);
Summers v. Adams, 669 F. Supp. 2d 637 (D.S.C. 2009) (ruling in favor of plaintiff who brought
Establishment Clause challenge to state’s license plate depicting a cross and the statement “I Believe”
and who sought declaratory and injunctive relief under section 1983).
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In short, courts enjoined the government’s unconstitutional speech
long before the Court had developed a vocabulary—much less a
doctrine—for addressing government speech. And courts are not
necessarily limited to traditional forms of injunctive relief that simply
require the government to stop or remove its constitutionally harmful
speech: as Tracy Thomas explains more generally, courts can also issue
prophylactic injunctions to require training, monitoring, and other actions
as necessary to ensure the government’s compliance with the Constitution
and prevent future violations. 40 Additional possibilities might include
requiring the government to apologize or offer possibilities for corrective
counterspeech. 41
III. CALL IT OUT: DECLARATORY RELIEF AND DAMAGES
To be sure, injunctive relief may well be unavailable in cases where
the government is unlikely to repeat or continue its expressive choices that
have infringed upon its targets’ constitutional rights. 42 This Part III thus
explores other remedies for naming and deterring the constitutional
injuries sometimes inflicted by the government’s speech.
A.

Declaratory Relief

Declaratory relief is generally available to “call out” governmental
speech that violates specific constitutional protections even absent a

40. Tracy A. Thomas, The Prophylactic Remedy: Normative Principles and Definitional
Parameters of Broad Injunctive Relief, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 301, 309 (2004); see also id. at 380
(“Prophylactic relief counters the lack of compliance with an adjudicated right and its instrumental
remedy by (1) avoiding the defendants’ resistance to the right by mandating specific change, (2)
providing clear notice to the defendants of expected behavior, and (3) ensuring the practical
enforcement of the order by the court.”); see also Samuel L. Bray, The Myth of the Mild Declaratory
Judgment, 63 DUKE L.J. 1091, 1125 (2014) (“Injunctions come in many varieties. They can prevent
future violations or repair past ones. They can take the form of a simple flat prohibition; a positive
command; a long statute-like array of prohibitions and commands; or a court’s effective takeover of
operational control of an institution, such as a prison, school, or hospital”).
41. For an example of the government’s voluntary apology for its speech (i.e., not the result of
an injunction), the Office of the Solicitor General apologized in 2011 for its false representations in
its litigation defending the internment of Japanese-American citizens during World War II. See Neal
Katyal, Confession of Error: The Solicitor General’s Mistakes During the Japanese-American
DEP’T
OF
JUST.
ARCHIVES
(May
20,
2011),
Internment
Cases,
U.S.
https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/blog/confession-error-solicitor-generals-mistakes-duringjapanese-american-internment-cases [https://perma.cc/884T-HP2E].
42. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) (holding that the plaintiff did not
have standing to seek an injunction against the police department’s allegedly unconstitutional use of
chokeholds when the plaintiff could not show that he would likely again suffer from such a
chokehold).
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viable claim for damages or injunctive relief.43 Moreover, declaratory
relief’s primarily expressive character may be seen as more respectful of
other governmental branches than more coercive forms of judicial relief.44
Indeed, we can understand declaratory relief itself as a form of “soft law”
that nevertheless performs important expressive and deterrent (i.e.,
naming and shaming) functions. 45 At the same time, declaratory relief
leaves open the possibility of further “hard law” relief that may take the
form of injunctions or damages. 46

43. See 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (“In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction . . . any court
of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal
relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be
sought. Any such declaration shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree and shall
be reviewable as such.”). For examples of successful claims for declaratory relief for the
government’s unconstitutional speech, see Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. V. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000)
(ruling in favor of plaintiff who brought Establishment Clause challenge to public high school’s
prayer at football games and who sought injunctive and declaratory relief under section 1983);
Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963) (ruling in favor of plaintiff who sought injunctive and
declaratory relief against state agency’s threatening speech that violated free speech protections);
Joyner v. Forsyth County, 653 F.3d 341 (4th Cir 2011) (ruling in favor of plaintiff who brought
Establishment Clause challenge to county board’s sponsorship of certain sectarian prayers and who
sought declaratory and injunctive relief under section 1983); Robinson v. City of Edmond, 68 F.3d
1226 (10th Cir. 1995) (ruling in favor of plaintiff who brought Establishment Clause challenge to city
seal that depicted a cross and who sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as nominal damages
and attorney’s fees under section 1983); Summers v. Adams, 669 F. Supp. 2d 637 (D.S.C. 2009)
(ruling in favor of plaintiff who brought Establishment Clause challenge to state’s license plate
depicting a cross and the statement “I Believe” and who sought declaratory and injunctive relief under
section 1983); see also Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 140-41
(1951) (discussing availability of declaratory relief with respect to the government’s potentially
unlawful speech).
44. See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 466 (1974) (“Congress plainly intended declaratory
relief to act as an alternative to the strong medicine of the injunction . . . .”); see also Bray, supra note
40, at 1093-94 (2014) (explaining that, unlike injunctive relief, declaratory relief includes neither a
command to the defendant nor a sanction for noncompliance).
45. See Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 124-26 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“Even where
a declaration of unconstitutionality is not reviewed by this Court, the declaration may still be able to
cut down the deterrent effect of an unconstitutional state statute. The persuasive force of the court’s
opinion and judgment may lead state prosecutors, courts, and legislators to reconsider their respective
responsibilities toward the statute. Enforcement policies or judicial construction may be changed, or
the legislature may repeal the statute and start anew.”); Bray, supra note 40, at 1121 (“[O]nce we put
aside the simplistic notion that word is less powerful than deed, it no longer makes sense to say that
the declaratory judgment is a milder remedy because it merely declares.”); id. at 1124 (“The central
difference between the declaratory judgment and the injunction in contemporary American law is
management, in the sense of continuing judicial direction and oversight of the parties. The injunction
enables a high degree of management. The declaratory judgment does not. As a result, the decision
to grant one or the other of these remedies should chiefly be a decision about the degree of direction
and oversight that the relationship of the parties requires of the court.”).
46. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2202 (“Further necessary or proper relief based on a declaratory judgment
or decree may be granted, after reasonable notice and hearing, against any adverse party whose rights
have been determined by such judgment.”); see also Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Walbrook Ins.
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Damages

Sometimes the government’s speech inflicts damage of the sort that
the law has traditionally treated as relatively quantifiable.47 Examples
include the government’s lies that lead to wrongful arrest or
imprisonment 48 or the government’s threatening speech that leads to its
target’s job loss. For example, the Sixth Circuit refused to dismiss a
section 1983 claim for damages by a plaintiff who alleged that the
government had retaliated against her constitutionally protected speech
with false and coercive speech of its own that led to her firing. 49 More
specifically, after the plaintiff had expressed opposition to the county’s
proposed highway project at a public meeting, a county official called her
employer, falsely stated that the plaintiff had identified her employer in
opposing the project, and asked whether the employer was truly
committed to local development. 50 The employer fired the plaintiff shortly
thereafter, allegedly because the county’s false claim led it to believe that
she had used the employer’s name in opposing the development project. 51
In declining to dismiss the plaintiff’s claim for damages, the court
concluded that the governmental expression at issue would violate free

Co., Ltd., 41 F.3d 764, 773-74 (1st Cir. 1994) (“Section 2202 . . . authoriz[es] a district court to grant
additional relief consistent with the underlying declaration even though the right to the relief may
arise long after the court has entered its declaratory judgment.”).
47. To be sure, the government is sometimes immunized from damages liability. For example,
the Court has held that governmental actors enjoy absolute immunity from money damages when they
have been found to have violated the law when engaged in certain essential governmental functions.
See Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 227-29 (1988) (discussing absolute immunity for judges
performing certain judicial actions); Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982) (holding that the
President is absolutely immune from civil damages liability for his official acts). Government actors
found to have violated the Constitution when engaged in functions that do not trigger absolute
immunity may nevertheless enjoy “qualified immunity” from money damages so long as they did not
violate law that was clearly established at the time and of which a reasonable person would have been
aware. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Relatedly, the Supreme Court has held
that state and local government actors’ defamatory speech does not trigger procedural due process
protections under section 1983 unless it causes job loss or some other economic injury in addition to
a stigmatic injury. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712 (1976). Governmental immunities, however, are
sometimes waived or limited. E.g., Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259 (1993) (declining to find
that a prosecutor’s allegedly false statements made when announcing a defendant’s indictment fell
within the zone of prosecutorial functions that are absolutely immune from damages liability).
48. See, e.g., Manuel v. City of Joliet, Ill., 137 S. Ct. 911 (2017) (where the challenger brought
a section 1983 lawsuit alleging that law enforcement officers’ lies about the content of substances
seized from him led to his arrest and pretrial detention in violation of the Fourth Amendment).
49. Paige v. Coyner, 614 F.3d 273 (6th Cir. 2010).
50. Id. at 276.
51. Id. at 277.
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speech protections if intended, and reasonably likely, to retaliate against
the plaintiff’s speech by encouraging her employer to fire her. 52
Even when the constitutional injuries inflicted by government speech
can be difficult to quantify in monetary terms, nominal damages can serve
both expressive and deterrent functions. 53 This can be the case, for
example, when the government’s speech silences its targets, or causes
them to refrain from exercising a protected right or from seeking a certain
opportunity. Indeed, in the section 1983 context the Court has emphasized
the value of nominal damages more generally in cases where
constitutional injuries are hard to quantify in monetary terms:
By making the deprivation of such rights actionable for nominal
damages without proof of actual injury, the law recognizes the
importance to organized society that those rights be scrupulously
observed; but at the same time, it remains true to the principle that
substantial damages should be awarded only to compensate actual injury
or, in the case of exemplary or punitive damages, to deter or punish
malicious deprivations of rights. 54

The award of nominal damages can thus establish the unconstitutionality
of the government’s actions—and, by putting government officials on
notice of such action’s unconstitutionality, may eliminate the availability
of qualified immunity from money damages in future cases. The award of
nominal damages also materially alters the legal relationship of the
parties, and thus sometimes permits the award of attorney’s fees to the
plaintiff under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. 55
James E. Pfander has made similar, and forceful, arguments in the
context of Bivens claims 56 for monetary damages for federal officials’
unconstitutional conduct in the war on terror:
52. Id. at 281-83.
53. Nominal damages, according to Black’s Law Dictionary, are a “trifling sum awarded when
a legal injury is suffered but there is no substantial loss or injury to be compensated” and serve as a
declaration that the plaintiff’s legal rights have been violated. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 396
(7th ed. 1999). In contrast, a declaratory judgment is “a binding adjudication that establishes the rights
and other legal relations of the parties without providing for or ordering enforcement.” Id. at 846.
54. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 266, 1978; see also Memphis Community Sch. Dist. v. Stachura,
477 U.S. 299, 308 n.11 (1986) (holding that nominal damages are the appropriate remedy for
violations of constitutional rights where actual injury cannot be shown: “Our discussion of that issue
makes clear that nominal damages, and not damages based on some undefinable ‘value’ of infringed
rights, are the appropriate means of ‘vindicating’ rights whose deprivation has not caused actual,
provable injury.”).
55. Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 121 (1992).
56. Bivens claims are implied private rights of actions for compensatory and punitive damages
for “a compensable injury to a legally protected interest by a deprivation of a right secured by the
Constitution and the laws of the United States at the hands of a federal official acting under color of
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[T]he federal courts should focus on the narrow (but supremely
important) task of evaluating the legality of official conduct. Once that
understanding of the judicial role has been accepted, existing law
furnishes ample tools with which to reach the merits of misconduct
claims. First, rather than making case-by-case assessments of the
viability of Bivens claims, the federal courts should presume the
availability of such an action and focus their attention on the nature of
the constitutional right at issue. Such an approach would mirror that of
the federal courts in Section 1983 litigation against state officials, thus
bringing into closer alignment the application of constitutional
principles to both the state and federal levels of government. Second,
the Court should rethink its qualified immunity jurisprudence to
facilitate merits adjudication of legal claims. One way to accomplish
such a return to the merits would be to allow litigants to limit themselves
to a claim for nominal damages. Such nominal claims would enable the
court to reach the constitutional issue in a world of legal uncertainty
without confronting the officer with a threat of personal liability and
triggering the qualified immunity defense. Public interest law firms and
some plaintiffs might agree to take on the burden of litigating nominal
claims to secure a measure of vindication and to better define the limits
of what government can do in the name of national security. Both of
these important changes can be made with no action by Congress; they
both have a strong foundation in current law. 57

For similar reasons, nominal damages should be available to name and
deter government expression that violates specific free speech, free press,
due process, and equal protection guarantees—such as coercive or
threatening government speech that silences its targets, or governmental
lies that deprive their targets of the meaningful ability to exercise voting
or reproductive rights.
IV. CONCLUSION
As James Pfander worries more generally, our failure to identify and
provide remedies for constitutional violations leads to a shortage of law
about when the government violates the Constitution. 58 I worry about that
possibility specifically in the context of government speech; although
governments from their inception have engaged in expression, only
federal law. The only proper defendants are federal employees in their individual capacities, or private
actors whose conduct is so related to the federal government that they can be deemed federal agents
or actors.” HAROLD S. LEWIS, JR. & ELIZABETH J. NORMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS LAW AND PRACTICE 243
(2001).
57. JAMES PFANDER, CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS AND THE WAR ON TERROR, xviii (2017).
58. See id.
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recently have we begun to consider the ways in which the government’s
speech sometimes threatens constitutional rights. Again, my ambitions for
this short essay are modest: to show that the government’s expressive
choices that harm specific constitutional interests are amenable to
constitutional remedies in some situations, and thus that the judiciary has
some role to play in this area. In so doing, I hope to provide a platform for
future thinking and problem-solving.

